Abstract: This paper starts with the observation that almost all military dictatorships that democratize become presidential democracies. I hypothesize that military interests are able to coordinate on statuspreserving institutional change prior to democratization and therefore prefer political institutions with strong veto players. Parallel civilian interests conversely suffer from coordination failure by being more diverse and les cohesive. The hypothesis therefore implies that most military democratizations are partially planned while most democratization events from civilian autocracy are either unforeseen or poorly planned. Exploring the characteristics of 111 democratization episodes between 1950 and 2015, I find a number of features broadly consistent with further theoretical predictions.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, more than 50 countries have democratized although several democratic regime transitions have proven to be unstable. When communism collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, many countries rapidly democratized when they got the chance. Poland and Czechoslovakia held free and fair elections in late 1989 and with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, democracy spread to both the neighbouring Baltic countries and as far as Mongolia. Similarly, the end of the Cold War brought new impetus to African democracy and even earlier, several military dictatorships in Latin America had moved towards democracy.
While a long literature since Lipset (1959) has discussed when societies democratize and whether or not the regime transition is stable, much less attention has been given the particular choice of democratic institutions: Democracy can exist as a presidential or parliamentary system, with one or two chambers, different election procedures and a variety of veto institutions and constitutional differences.
The focus of this paper is to explore which type of democracy -and which consequences -may arise when different types of autocracies introduce effectively democratic political institutions.
The starting point of the paper is a peculiar feature that democratization studies seem to have been ignoring so far: When military dictatorships -that is, autocracies in which the political executives have military ranks and backgrounds -democratize, they virtually always turn into presidential democracies. As such, the Latin American tradition of military dictatorship provides an explanation for why most democracies in the region are presidential. Conversely, democratization from either communist or civilian autocracy does not result in a particular type of political institution.
Attempting to make sense of this fact, I develop a model of autocratic democratization. The model rests on the fact that democratization represents a potential threat to the status quo but so does the risk of coups when autocracy is maintained. Democratization thus becomes a choice between competing regime risks. When a move towards democratic political institutions either becomes 3 attractive to incumbent elite interests or politically inevitable, the incumbent is likely to attempt to influence the particular design of those institutions such that they best protect the interests of his selectorate. Because military interests are better able to organize a 'constitutional lobby', military dictatorships are therefore more likely to both change constitutional rules prior to democratization and to choose a set-up in which a powerful president can act as a potential status quo-preserving veto player.
A simple comparison of the constitutions and other elements of political institutions after 111 democratization episodes since 1950 reveals a number of features that are broadly consistent with the theory. In particular, military dictatorships have been significantly more likely to introduce new constitutions before democratization while other autocracies were substantially less likely to introduce constitutional changes. Overall, the new constitutions in military dictatorships were likely to resemble what in the United Kingdom came to be called 'the King in Parliament', i.e. institutions in which different political actors hold de facto veto power (cf. North and Weingast, 1989) . Further, when a democracy implemented by a military dictatorship collapses, it almost always does so as a result of the military itself retaking power.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. I first document the main difference between military and non-military democratizations, using Bjørnskov and Rode's (2017) recent update of the large DD dataset from Cheibub et al. (2010) . Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework and sets out the main propositions following from it. In Section 4, I document that several additional differences between military and civilian democratizations are consistent with the theoretical considerations.
Section 5 concludes.
MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS BECOME PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES
Before proceeding to a theoretical explanation of why certain forms of autocratic regimes might choose different types of democratization, I first document that the main claim upon which the rest of the 4 paper rests is factually plausible. Doing so, I rely on the new dataset in Bjørnskov and Rode (2017) , which categorizes regime types following the approach in Cheibub et al. (2010) . This means that all democracies are categorized as either parliamentary (regime type 0) or two types of presidential institutions depending on whether the president is mostly ceremonial (type 1) or has more direct discretionary power (type 2). Likewise, autocracies are categorized based on the characteristics of the executive: civilian autocracies are separate from military dictatorships in having an executive without a military rank or background (types 3 and 4). Finally, the dataset also includes absolutist monarchy (i.e., royal autocracies; type 5) and colonies.
1 Table 1 is the transition matrix of the dataset. The overall distinction between democracy and dictatorship is, as in Cheibub et al. (2010) , whether or not the country has free and fair elections, as judged by international observers, in which government power can change through peaceful means.
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Insert Figure 1 about here
The table first clearly shows that most regimes are relatively stable, illustrated by the large number of observations along the diagonal. It also illustrates how rarely democracies change type, i.e. how stable constitutional arrangements are once countries are democratic. As long as countries remain democratic, their basic choices of political institutions remain extremely stable. Conversely, the dataset includes 111 regime transitions from some form of autocracy to democracy, of which 32 occurred from a civilian autocracy, 66 from military dictatorship and three from absolutist monarchy.
1 An alternative way of categorizing autocracies, popularized by Geddes (1999) , consists in distinguishing between personalist, military and single-party regimes. In the following, most military dictatorships, as categorized by Bjørnskov and Rode (2017) , would also be categorized as military by Geddes (1999) , and all communist regimes in the following are also single-party. The main difference is that civilian autocracies, in the present category, need not be personal.
2 It may be worth noting that the particular definition of democracy implies that regimes can transition away from democracy if they implement changes that de facto means that they cannot lose an election. This for example occurred through constitutional amendment in Sri Lanka in 1977 and arguably by fraud in the October 2011 Liberian elections.
5
The particular feature of this paper is that of the 66 regime transitions from military dictatorship to some form of democracy, only eight resulted in a parliamentary democracy. The transition matrix thus clearly exemplifies the main point of departure of the rest of the paper. In addition, of eight potential examples of non-presidential democratization from military dictatorship, only three -Pakistan on two occasions (1988 and 2008) , and Sudan in 1986 -could realistically have introduced a presidential system. The remaining military dictatorships that became parliamentary democracies all share a particular feature: monarchy. Laos and Greece both abandoned monarchy through constitutional change only after having democratized, and Thai democracy has been punctuated by episodes in which the military briefly took power in 1979, 1992 and 2008 . However, even the three non-monarchical democratizations are questionable. In the brief episode of Sudanese democracy, the interim constitution defined the head of state as a shared responsibility between a president and four additional members of a state council (Ginsburg et al., 2009 ). In the case of Pakistan, the political institutions are best categorized as parliamentary, but with the important caveat that the otherwise exclusively ceremonial president retains the formal political control of the military.
The particular military control is also visible in the 36 cases in which the new democracy failed to last for more than a decade. In the 11 cases in which the initial state was a civilian autocracy that democratized, the nature of the autocracy taking over from what must be a fragile democracy was almost random. In six cases, the new regime was again a civilian autocracy while in five cases, the military had taken over and dismantled the democratic institutions. Of the 24 clear cases in which the military had democratized but democracy turned out to be fragile, there is only one case in which it did not happen through a military coup.
The single case is Peru in the 1990s where the democratically elected President Alberto Fujimori disregarded the democratic institutions and eventually had to flee the country. After a de facto autocratic interim, the constitutional institutions proved robust enough to re-establish democracy without much ado.
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The post-WWII experience thus clearly suggests that democratization from military dictatorship is structurally different than democratization from alternative forms of autocracy. In the following section, I therefore outline a theoretical framework to illustrate the particular characteristics of military democratization. Subsequently I show that additional features of the theoretical framework are also broadly consistent with other known differences between military and civilian democratization episodes.
A THEORY OF OPTIMAL REGIME BEHAVIOUR
The theoretical model includes three types of agents: ordinary citizens, members of two latent political elites, and potential members of the autocracy. The citizens act as consumers in all political regimes while some (but not all) firms have access to special treatment. The military is a fourth residual agent that receives military spending and may either instigate a coup against the incumbent government or implement democratization.
The theoretical set-up of the political institutions is simple and only captures the most salient features of the decision process around democratization. First, the political institutions of the country are characterized by having two elites that each form a latent selectorate: a relatively cohesive military elite consisting of q factions, and an industrial elite consisting of n groups. I assume that 1≤q<n such that the military may be represented by a single cohesive interest group while the industrial elite is always factionalized. Any autocracy can be actively supported by either elite, but not by both at the same time. Within each latent elite, the autocracy must be supported by a minimum coalition, which either represents a majority within the elite or a sufficiently large minority such that no other competing coalition is likely to form. All regimes support each potential selectorate through some form of transfer payments, m (to the military) and s (to civilian interests).
In the case that the country becomes democratic, two parties either already exist as remainders of whatever electoral system the incumbent autocracy allowed, or are likely to form. factors.
Yet, in order to make sense of the potential transitions between different political regimes, it is necessary to trace the interests of firms and thereby, subsequently, the interests of any potential incumbent. I therefore first outline the main assumptions of firm and individual behaviour before turning to the political interests in the two basic forms of political institutions -autocracy and democracy.
3.1. Firm, military and individual behaviour I first outline how individual consumers, firms and the military behave in the economy. Consumers have standard preferences described by U for a range of goods, xi supplied at price pi, and supply one unit of labour inelastically. This yields the maximization problem in 1) where E is after-tax incomedefined by a wage w and an income tax rate τ such that w(1-τ) for ordinary labour -and the n th good is the numeraire with pn=1.
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The relative demand for any single good thus becomes:
Firm behaviour is given by the assumption that the economy consists of n firms, each producing a single good, and that each firm has monopolistic power. Each good is produced with only one input -labour, denoted li -and each firm has its own technology, ai, such that some firms are more productive than others. Yet, firms can in principle gain a price subsidy of s percent if they are politically connected in a way defined in the following -one can perhaps best think of this subsidy as an indirect subsidy arising from trade protection (cf. Hillman, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1994) . Firms pay the wage w and may incur a cost ci in order to be a member of the selectorate group that gets access to the price subsidy. In case they are not part of the selectorate supporting the incumbent government, s is simply 1 and ci is 0. Firms therefore maximize the profit function in (4), taking their demand functions (3) into account due to their monopolistic power.
This yields both a choice of how large a workforce to employ, li, and whether or not to incur the cost ci of being a member of the selectorate group and getting s. This cost is easily thought of as a coordination or lobbying cost in the tradition of Olson (1965 Olson ( , 1982 . Employment in industry i thus becomes (5a), which illustrates the distortionary effects of the price subsidy. Solving the optimization problem for industry n (given in the appendix), which is the numeraire industry and which I assume cannot affect its price level -for example by being subject to either perfect competition conditions or international competition -the labour decision becomes (5b). A comparison between total profits with and without selectorate group membership (and thus the access to the subsidy) yields the membership condition in (6).
Equation (6) expresses the necessary price subsidy that would 'buy' support for the incumbent government from a sufficient share of the industrial selectorate. The inequality in (6) thus provides an expression of the minimum price subsidy needed for any industrial interest to support an incumbent government. 4 In the following, I refer to this sufficient level simply as s*. The definition of sufficiency is that it must yield the support of a subset K of all n firms that provides the incumbent regime with an effective selectorate majority. The appendix provides the formal solution for a minimum subsidy that yields increasing profits for the affected firms, and thus an expression of s* given no coordination costs. This level of s is increasing in economic and technological development.
Finally, the military has simple preferences for larger spending, as given by the objective function M=my -cm, where y is total income in society and cm is a cost of coordinating on supporting a military regime similar to the ci cost of firms. The military therefore has incentives similar to a stationary bandit, as part of the maximization of M is also a maximization of taxable income y (cf. Olson, 1982) .
Optimal policy for autocracies
4 A further logical extension of this result is that the incumbent government may have a particular interest in choosing a policy mix that, for example, yields sufficient subsidies to a subset of industries -perhaps best thought of as what was once called the 'commanding heights' industries -while achieving the opposite for other industries. This may be thought of as a policy mix in which a subset is protected by high import tariffs while other industries that could potentially form an alternative majority are exposed to free trade. This mix would reduce their profit margin to the extent that they would have little interest in seeking a subsidy -and thus represent a threat to the incumbent -because the coordination cost would be prohibitively high relative to the potential gain.
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The main political problem for an autocracy, stated by Tullock (1987) as "The Dictator's Dilemma", is staying in power. Most policy decisions are therefore aimed primarily at keeping other groups effectively away from power. A regime that aims at staying autocratic must therefore secure direct support either from the military or the industrial selectorate as well as providing repression.
Every government chooses a policy vector {m, s, r, a} where m is the share of the budget allocated to military spending, s is spending on industrial policy, r is spending on repression and a is residual spending on the autocratic top. All spending is funded by tax revenue such that τ = m + s + r + a. 5 The optimal policy vector for regimes that plan on staying autocratic must therefore be a combination of paying off interest groups in the military, m, and the industrial selectorate, s, and investing in active repression, r, while leaving some residual, a, for whoever is in power. The a-term can perhaps best be interpreted as a combination of luxury accessible to the presidential retinue, the prime minister or top officials and a personal gain from being in power. With any policy vector, total income in society thus becomes (7). The corresponding equilibrium wage w is given in the appendix.
equivalent subgame perfect Markov equilibrium. The optimal trade-off is given the first-order condition in the appendix, which translates into the following.
Lemma 1: The optimal coup risk for military dictatorship (given in 9) and for civilian autocracies (given in 10) depend on the effectiveness of spending compared to its relative costs in the following way.
As such, the model illustrates a similar phenomenon to Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) replacement effect: the risk of observing a successful coup attempt is likely to be decreasing in military spending (for military dictatorships) and industrial support (for civilian autocracies). Yet, it also illustrates that even military dictatorships are likely to have an incentive to invest in buying support through industrial policy , as the optimal risk is also given (with χ=1) as (11), which yields the optimal spending allocation for pure military dictatorships in (12).
Proposition 1: Military dictatorships trade off military and civilian threats to power by partially mimicking the industrial policy of civilian autocracies to appease civilian interests.
Again, as both μm and μs must logically be negative, this puts a cap on the size of military spending, m. A level of m in excess of
will be irrational under all circumstances, as the marginal effect of spending on the probability of regime survival actively turns negative above this maximum level.
It thus remains possible that influential military interests demand spending that a military regime must meet in order to keep a sufficient majority of the military selectorate from finding it profitable to 12 attempt to organize a coup, or the costs of the industrial policy that a civilian autocracy must bear in order to keep sufficient majority of the industrial selectorate from finding attempting a coup, are so great that democratization becomes a viable and attractive option. Yet, as Przeworski (1991, 14) emphasizes, democratization is to some extent a process of "institutionalizing uncertainty."
Optimal democratization -the military perspective
A necessary part of the main question in this paper is why autocracies choose to democratize, and specifically why military dictatorships do so in a very particular way. Within the same general framework, it is therefore necessary to attempt to trace the interests of regimes that may desire to
democratize. Yet, a complication is that democratization need not be a final decision. As experience shows, it remains a possibility that either the democratizing interests or competing interests may want to attempt to re-establish autocracy by ways of a coup if their conditions deteriorate sufficiently under the new democratic institutions.
In order to map the options, I therefore include two types of incentives in the theoretical considerations. First, any incumbent regime has an incentive to choose the type of democratic regime that is most likely to benefit its background support interests. In addition, Bell (2016) argues that it may be tempting for a democratizing regime to impose democratic constraints on the (new) executive, which will inhibit his or her ability to combat a coup attempt. This yields a powerful incentive, which is compatible with the normative foundations of democracy: to design democratic political institutions that do not allow for any form of repression that might be necessary to prevent a coup from happening or succeeding.
I simplify the first type of incentive as a choice between two different institutional forms of democracy. Given that the incumbent autocrat decides to allow democratization, he can first either choose to write a new constitution, or continue with the existing constitution. In both cases, part of the effective change is that the constitution must be respected post-democratization. In case the autocrat 13 decides to introduce a new constitution, two basic types of constitutions are possible: 1) either a fully parliamentary political system in which elections to the parliament decide the eventual formation of government and thus the pay-off to the selectorates; or 2) a democratic system with presidential institutions in which the parliament and the president jointly determine the outcome. In the latter case, each selectorate is likely to select a presidential candidate to run for office in separate presidential elections.
The main difference between the two types of democratic political institutions is the probability of having divided government in the presidential system. As such, there are no potential veto players in parliamentary systems, which implies that a parliamentary system is, all other things being equal, the more risky choice. On the other hand, a presidential system will likely resemble what came to be known as "the King in Parliament" after the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688 (North and Weingast, 1989) . This type of democratic institution, at its simplest, merely maintains the status quo when the parliamentary majority and the president cannot reach an agreement. As originally stressed by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) , bicameral systems entail an implicit supermajority requirement when the two chambers, or in this case the president and the parliament, come to represent different interests. It therefore also reduces the probability of reaching what would be the best possible outcome for an incumbent interest.
If the incumbent autocracy decides to democratize, the regime thus has a second choice to make in the form of the type of democracy. In the case the incumbent autocrat decides not to democratize, the regime is likely to continue unchanged, but with a positive risk μ of being ousted in a coup. The choice is therefore one of trading off the competing risks inherent in competing institutional choices.
The entire decisions structure is illustrated in the game tree in Figure 1 .
Insert Figure 1 about here
In the following, I make two main economic assumptions. First, I assume a long run benefit of becoming democratic -a democratic dividend, Δ -for example through the effects of better judicial 14 institutions (cf. North, 1991; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2006) . Second, I
assume that military dictatorships have varied in competence, a term ξ that linearly affects the productivity ai of all firms, such that there is a potential difference between civilian autocracies as well as between different military dictatorships. The competence term ξ is distributed iid around 1.
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I further make two necessary political assumptions: that the risk of the pro-military party losing a parliamentary election, θ, and the risk of the pro-military candidate losing a presidential election, φ, are determined as (13) and (14). The elections are therefore affected by competence, how well the economy seems to be doing for the median citizen, captured by the income ym, and a random term υ; the appendix provides expressions of the median income. In addition, the choices made by any democratic government are limited by the need to eliminate the risk of being ousted in a coup after the election. As such, this differs from the risk μ in autocracies because the second incentive for regimes is affected by the assumption that r=0 in democracies. In other words, I assume that democracies abide by a constitutional ban on direct repression.
With respect to the new democratic government, I assume that the winning party continues to represent the interests of the pre-democratization selectorates. This is therefore an assumption of minimal change, which avoids introducing more complicating elements into the democratization decision. As such, the objective function of any government is given by (15). The term ω captures the probability that the government is elected and gains actual influence, and is therefore simply given by θ 6 The competence term ξ may both encapsulate the competence of the actual leaders, but also the norms of accountability and what is acceptable policy (cf. Bidner and Francois, 2013) . It is worth noting that theoretically, military competence (as in equations )18) and (19)) may either increase or decrease the incentive to democratize, as the net effect depends on the coup risk when not democratizing relative to the risk of losing a democratic election.
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for party A in parliamentary systems (and 1-θ for party P) and θ φ for party A in presidential systems (
(1-θ)(1-φ) for party B).
Maximizing G yields the two trade-offs between spending on the military and industrial policy facing parties A and P should they win the election. The solutions yield:
However, a potentially important difference occurs in democracies and not autocracies. With two parties (or two coherent blocs), the parties are likely to compete for the support of the median voter.
The ym in (13), (14), (16) and (17) refers to the income of the median voter, which may or may not include profits from a firm in the K-set receiving the price subsidy. The term dy/dm is simply the tax effect -Rw/s where R is the relative profit share of firms in the K-set -and thus unambiguously negative, which requires the second term of (16) to be negative and larger. For the optimal military spending to be positive -which it must by a margin as shown in (22) -dym/ds must be negative and larger; in other words, voters must react sufficiently against the income losses resulting from industrial policy for democratization to be a logical choice.
Comparing the relative pay-offs in all states of the game yields an optimal choice for the military in favour of democratization to a parliamentary system iff (18) holds, and in favour of democratization to a presidential system iff (19) holds:
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Rearranging, given that they democratize, the military will prefer a presidential system iff (20) holds. This subsequently yields the requirement that (21) holds if the military prefers firstly to democratize and secondly to do so within a presidential system, which provides the second proposition.
Proposition 2: When the potential gains from democratization, weighted by the difference between competing risks of losing power in a democracy relative to an autocracy, exceed the risk-weighted loss from democratization, a military dictatorship is likely to democratize with presidential institutions. Proposition 3: If the military is prepared to attempt a coup d'état to reverse democratization outcomes particularly averse to its interests, the military will always prefer democratization with presidential institutions. Proof: see the appendix. 7 An additional result here is that military competence makes it more likely that a presidential system is preferable whenever the condition (1 − ) 0 < Δ(1 − )(1 − ) holds. This essentially implies the intuitive condition that when the best military spending under autocracy is smaller than the best possible expected military spending under democracy, a more competent military regime will chose to democratize to a presidential system that minimizes its potential loss.
Given the threat of a coup attempt in order to establish (or re-establish) military dictatorship, it thereby always becomes the optimal choice for a military dictatorship to choose a presidential democracy when democratizing. In other words, the combination of the veto institution of presidential democracy and a coup threat is equivalent to a low-cost insurance policy for the military. Yet, whether a coup is likely or not depends on the democratic gain Δ, the coordination costs of the military, and the competence or the likelihood of the coup succeeding. A further final insight here is therefore that setting the minimal ma may thus under some conditions keep any anti-military parties from running for election in an otherwise democratic new political system. While the new political institutions are formally democratic, it remains a possibility that a latent coup threat might make it unattractive to the point of irrelevance for anti-military interests to run for office.
Optimal democratization -the non-military perspective
Finally, it is necessary to explore whether the incentive structure behind democratization from a civilian autocracy differs from that of an initial military dictatorship. Figure 1 again provides an overview of the symmetrical decision structure and the potential pay-offs to the selectorate groups. The main difference between a military and civilian autocratic decision nevertheless is that the civilian autocracy, should it choose to democratize, faces two additional, complicating factors.
First, compared to a military regime, the election outcomes also depend on whether or not the interests of the median voter are aligned with firms in the K-set or not. If the median voter does not have a direct stake in the profits of a firm within the K-set, i.e. a firm that is likely to receive the price subsidy, the electoral consequences of increasing the subsidy are larger. A civilian autocracy when democratizing therefore does not necessarily have a parallel interest as the military in implementing veto institutions to maintain the status quo. In the case that the median voter is not aligned with the interests of the initial industrial selectorate majority (the K-set), the civilian regime may have a parallel interest in maintaining the status quo. Yet, in the opposite case, a larger probability of maintaining the 18 status quo would run counter to the interests, because democratization here, all other things being equal, would result in a higher subsidy. The main reasons are that the median voter has a comparatively stronger interest in industrial policy -the sign of dym/ds is ambiguous -and the democratic dividend Δ as well as the abolition of repression (r=0) provide larger resources available for funding the subsidy.
Finally, while it can be argued that civilian interests could find it attractive to attempt a coup d'état should the pro-military party win the elections in either system -a risk that is more consequential in a parliamentary system -it remains theoretically uncertain if the potential gain of doing so outweighs the costs of coordinating the k industrial interests necessary to form an effective selectorate majority.
This K-set is thus similar to a minimum winning coalition within the selectorate (cf. Yu and Jong-APin, 2016). Should they be so, a latent civilian coup against the new democracy would be more likely to incentivize a democratization process towards a parliamentary system than a presidential system. In terms of the formal model, the necessary condition for any firm within the initial K-set to participate in a coup attempt against a democracy with a pro-military party at power -even given that its optimal policy is not to provide the subsidy at all (s=0) -would be a coordination cost ci < μd (s0 -Δ). Given a large initial subsidy, a small democratic divided and a sufficient probability of a coup succeeding against the new democracy, a civilian latent threat may incentivize democratization towards a parliamentary
system. Yet, if this condition is met, it remains a possibility that the comparatively lower coordination costs of a military coup may be sufficiently small to topple either the civilian autocracy or the new democracy in the first place. The Polish regime prior to democratization is technically categorized (following the coding scheme in Cheibub et al., 2010) as a military dictatorship because the leader -General Wołciech Jaruzelski -had a military rank and position but still headed a communist regime. The Brazilian case also differs due to the special nature of the constitutional draft process in which broad interests within the population were taken into formal account.
In the third of the cases in which a democratizing military dictatorship chose not to write a new constitution, such as Argentina in 1957 and 1963 , the existing constitution tended to resemble the constitutions that other military regimes wrote before democratization. These features are broadly consistent with the theoretical outline, which presupposes that the military not only happens upon a presidential democracy, but actively designs it as such.
8 It should be noted that Poland is logically categorized as a military dictatorship because General Wojciech Jaruzelski had taken power in a coup in 1981. It was in all other respects a communist dictatorship, and thus much more similar to a civilian autocracy.
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The particular way in which new constitutions were drafted also differs significantly across initially civilian and military regimes. 85 % of the new constitutions in connection with civilian autocracies democratizing were drafted by either the legislature or the executive branch, or with heavy influence from either. In military dictatorships that democratized, the draft process of the more frequent new constitutions tended to be delegated to either a constitutional assembly appointed by the dictatorship or an elected special constitutional legislature assembly. Yet, before proceeding to any conclusions, two worries need to be settled. The first is that these differences may simply occur because the military also either rigs the institutions or elections such that the first democratically elected president belongs to the prior regime. In other words, does the dictator or his heir apparent carry on into the democratic age? The second is if the assumption that the military
keeps an option open for dismantling the new democracy is also reflected in observable actions.
The evidence suggests that the first situation has not generally been the case. Exploring the second question supports the basic theoretical approach. In the ten cases in which a democracy, deriving from a civilian autocracy, experienced a re-autocratization with the first ten years, exactly half were the result of a civilian-led coup and half of a military coup. In the 25 cases in which the military had democratized, 14 of which occurred within the first five years after the event, only one case exists in which the democracy was dismantled by a non-military interest. 9 The case is Peru in April 23 1992 when Alberto Fujimori violated his constitutional role by dissolving Congress, suspending the constitution, and purging the judiciary of most opponents of his regime. In all other cases, the military took power within a few years after democratizations that seemingly failed to satisfy its wishes.
However, a number of these events also underline the risk of attempting to do so. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper set out to provide a theoretical explanation for a particular phenomenon observable in data covering regime changes in the post-WWII period: when military dictatorships democratize, they overwhelmingly choose to do so in the form of presidential democracy while democratizations from other types of autocratic regimes do not exhibit any such regularity.
The theory indicates that in a situation in which both civilian autocracies and military dictatorships choose from a menu of political institutions with which to democratize, both will trade off competing risks. However, the military has substantially stronger preferences because it forms a relatively cohesive interest. Conversely, the civilian / industrial interests supporting a civilian autocracy are less cohesive as they suffer from Olsonian collective action problems (Olson, 1965) . In addition, while a pro-military democratic government will be generally supportive of the military, civilian interests may or may not gain from a having an anti-military government. This difference implies that the military is more likely to prefer a political system with strong veto players. The potential threat of a post-democratization coup further reinforces the military interest in a presidential democracy.
A set of indications from the period 1950-2015 support the general theoretical approach. When the military has democratized, it has also historically been much more likely to do so in a planned way by writing a new constitution or substantially amending the existing constitution prior to 25 democratization. The military tends to allocate particular powers to the president, as do the circumstances surrounding subsequent coups against the new democracy. In other words, the evidence here suggests that military democratizations in a majority of cases are clearly planned, contrary to the claim in Geddes (1999) that military dictatorships are more prone to regime instability and therefore tend to end in unplanned regime transitions. It is, conversely, consistent with Treisman's (2017) recent argument that most democratization events occurred by mistake, but implies that the mistakes and neglect that leads to random democratization are much more likely in civilian autocracies.
A final question to ask is if the structural differences between the resulting types of democracy are important. Other research suggests so: Persson and Tabellini (1998) However, most existing studies have tended to treat all autocracies as fundamentally similar although some of the foundational studies of autocracy did not (cf. Tullock, 1987; Wintrobe, 1990) .
The main finding justifying this paper strongly suggests that they are not, and that more thought should be devoted to how different types of autocracies differ. This paper should merely be considered a humble beginning.
APPENDIX A -THEORY As a first, normalizing the total supply of inelastic labour at 1, and setting total demand for labour at 1 as in (A2), the equilibrium wage rate can be given as (A3a), expressed as a function of labour demand in industry n in (A1), or the less wieldy expression in (A3b). It is easy to see that increasing the subsidy s will reduce the wage rate. As it also increases price levels, the overall welfare effect of ordinary citizens 26 is unambiguously negative. At the national level, the effect is also negative as the positive effects on profits in firms with the K-set cannot outweigh the negative effects for most citizens due to the adverse effect on overall resource allocation (firms within the K-set come to employ too much labour reallocated from more efficient uses).
Rearranging (5) and (6) and differentiating, it is straightforward to show that the minimum size of the price subsidy s, which will yield a positive effect on profits in supported firms, is given by (A4).
Differentiating, the total effects of the price subsidy s on wages are given by (A5). The marginal effect of raising s thus depends both on the relative size of the initial wage and subsidy, but also intuitively on the relative share of total profits -the second fraction -accruing to the supported sectors (the K-set).
As such, any development that either affects the productivity within a 'favoured' industry, i.e. one in the subset K, or a development that affects the productivity of all sectors through the wage rate w, will increase the price of buying support from an industrial selectorate. In other words, for any given tax rate, economic development -whether balanced or not -can undermine the rationale of maintaining a civilian autocracy.
For the firm choices, the first order conditions of equation (7) are given by (A5) to (A7).
For the vote outcomes in (13) and (14), the total income is irrelevant. Due to the assumption of median voter politics, the income of the median voter is the relevant measure. (A8) provides the income of the median voter, given that she receives profits from a firm outside of the K-set. (A9) provides the median income for a voter with profit income from a firm within of the K-set, i.e. a firm that provides support for a civilian autocracy / party A and thus also receives the price subsidy. 
The sensitivity of the median incomes to raising the subsidy, i.e. of buying direct support from industrial special interests, is given by (A10) and (A11) where R is defined as the relative share of total profits accruing to the firm associated with the median voter. (A10) and (A11) represent the relevant sensitivities in the policy decisions in (16) and (17). While the sensitivity of ym is unambiguously negative when the median voter is not associated with a firm in the K-set, the sensitivity when the median voter is so may under specific circumstances become positive. However, as can be seen in (A11), this requires a sufficiently large subsidy, s, as well as a profit share R larger than αβ / (1-αβ). 
